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Faculty and Deans

STANDARD OIL AS LOCHNER'S TROJAN
HORSE
ALAN J. MEESE*

I. INTRODUCTION

Few decisions are as maligned as Lochner v. New York, which struck
down a law setting maximum hours for bakers. 1 Innumerable critics assert
that Lochner was a paradigmatic example of judicial activism, whereby
laissez-faire judges imposed their personal policy preferences under the
guise of judicial review. According to this widely shared view, both
Lochner and its progeny improperly read the "liberty" of the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments to include "liberty of contract," which the Court
then protected against substantive abridgment by laws that fell outside of
the police power. The police power, in turn, was defined narrowly, so as to
preclude, for instance, laws designed to transfer income from one class to
another. Thankfully, this school of thought concludes, the Supreme Court
abandoned Lochner and its progeny in 1937, thus allowing state
legislatures and Congress to have their way and impose redistributive
legislation, unfettered by private liberty, throughout the land.
Within antitrust circles, Standard Oifl is every bit as beloved as
Lochner is maligned. Despite its age, major decisions continue to endorse
Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason3 as an appropriate exposition of the
Sherman Act. Indeed, no Supreme Court Justice has (in recent memory)
questioned the correctness of Standard Oil or its holding that Section 1
* Ball Professor of Law & Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School.
The author thanks the conference organizers for the invitation to participate in this event as well as
Daniel Crane and Louis Kaplow for helpful comments.
I. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
3. /d. at 62. For a discussion of the modem rule of reason, see generally Andrew I. Gavil,
Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modem Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL.
L. REv. 733 (2012).
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only forbids "unreasonable" restraints. 4 On the contrary, the most
"progressive" Justices, while expressly criticizing Lochner, have invoked
and relied upon Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason when resolving
antitrust controversies.
The universal high regard for Standard Oil is ironic in light of the
opprobrium regularly heaped on Lochner. After all, as others have noted,
and as reiterated in this Essay, Standard Oil was simply an application of
Lochner to antitrust policy. Section 1 of the Sherman Act banned contracts
in restraint of trade, and Section 2 banned contracts and other conduct,
including the utilization of property, that monopolized. An unduly broad
reading of the statute, then, would infringe the liberty of contract that
Lochner and its progeny so jealously protected. That is to say, the nowlongstanding Rule of Reason served as a device to define the statute's
coverage so as not to ban contracts and other conduct protected by the due
process clause, but instead to reach only those contracts and conduct
susceptible to regulation under Lochner's regulatory paradigm. Thus, one
of constitutional law's most maligned decisions and its progeny live on, at
least nominally, with no sign of mortality.
Part II of this essay briefly recounts the vastly different treatments of
Lochner and Standard Oil by modern jurists and scholars. Part III
documents Standard Oil's reliance on Lochner-style concern for liberty of
contract to inspire and give content to the decision's Rule of Reason. This
part also rebuts the claim that Standard Oil's concern for contractual liberty
was somehow a novel departure from prior decisions such as Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States 5 and United States v. Joint Traffic Ass 'n, 6
which had banned "direct restraints" of trade, leaving "indirect restraints"
unscathed. Part IV explores how a Lochnerized Rule of Reason would
address two current antitrust controversies: first, the appropriate definition
of "consumer welfare," and second, whether courts should balance the
benefits that a "normal" restraint produces against resulting harms and
condemn the restraint when the harms outweigh the benefits. Part V
concludes.
4.
5.
6.

Standard Oil, 22 U.S. at 56.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
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II. A BRIEF TALE OF TWO CENTURY-OLD DECISIONS
For over four decades, Supreme Court Justices have been distinctly
split about the existence and content of substantive due process. Some have
argued that "process means process," that is, that the due process clauses in
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments place no limits on the content of
legislation, so long as the government provides sufficient procedural
protections before depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property_7 Most
Justices, however, have concluded that the due process clauses place
substantive limitations on the content of legislation, while at the same time
disagreeing about the nature of such limitations. 8
Despite these various points of discord, such Justices unanimously
agree on one thing-namely that the due process clauses provide no
meaningful protection for liberty of contract, with the result that Lochner
was wrongly decided. Indeed, no Justice who has served on the Supreme
Court during the last seven decades has endorsed Lochner or otherwise
embraced meaningful protection for liberty of contract. 9 Many have
expressly repudiated the decision, albeit for different reasons. 10 Some, as
already noted, have simply concluded that the due process clauses contain
no substantive component. 11 Others, however, have embraced substantive
7. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting "misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter"); id. at 3059 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the right to bear arms cannot be found "through a clause that speaks only
to 'process"').
8. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(offering a robust defense of substantive due process based on doctrine's historical pedigree); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (holding that the due process clause places
substantive limits on the magnitude and rationale for punitive damages); Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion) (holding that,
despite its plain language, the due process clause places substantive limitations on the content of state
legislation).
9. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 760-62 (Souter, J., concurring) (approving of precedents
holding that laws abridging liberty of contract require the lowest level of scrutiny); Planned
Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 861-62 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion) (contending that
circumstances required the Court to overrule Adkins v. Children 's Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525
(1923), and thus Lochner by implication); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority's opinion as "closely attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Peckham in [Lochner]" and endorsing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955), and its very deferential rational basis test, as the appropriate standard for reviewing economic
legislation); Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488 ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.").
10. See cases cited supra note 9.
II. See supra note 7.

786

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:783

due process but concluded that liberty of contract and liberty of occupation
are unimportant rights. 12 Thus, courts have upheld laws that burden or
eliminate the right to enter into particular contracts if the laws have a
rational basis. 13 This decision to employ a rational basis test generally is
outcome determinative. Over the past seven decades courts have repeatedly
sustained legislation that abridges significant economic rights with little or
no plausible regulatory benefits. 14 Indeed, the Lochner decision is so
maligned that "to Lochnerize" became a nonflattering verb more than three
decades ago. 15 Dissenting Justices and legal scholars often think they score
points by comparing allegedly activist majority opinions to Lochner. 16 In
fact, the Court has cited the decision seventy-four times since 1937, when
the Court abandoned meaningful protection for economic liberty, and not
once with approval. 17 Jurists have employed this Lochner-bashing
technique in decisions involving abortion, the nondelegation doctrine,
commercial speech, sovereign immunity, and the dormant commerce
clause, among others. 18
Yet, when it comes to interpreting the Sherman Act, the very same
Justices have embraced Standard Oil and thus implicitly endorsed Lochner
12. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 52! U.S. at 76().-{j2 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
13. See cases cited ilifra note 14.
14. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (unanimously sustaining a ban on
"debt-adjusting" by nonlawyers without determining the wisdom of it); Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 48788; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938) (upholding the federal Filled
Milk Act, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of milk whose fat had been removed
and replaced with oil from coconuts or other source). See also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
304--05 (1976) (finding that the right to pursue harmless occupation is not "fundamental" for purposes
of equal protection analysis).
15. BRIAN A. GARDNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 536-37 (2d ed. 1995)
(defining the term "Lochnerize" and stating that "[t]he term carries no small degree of opproprium").
Gardner invokes a 1978 treatise as an early example of such usage. /d. at 536 (quoting LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 435 (1978)).
16. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Citizens United and Davis v. FEC: Lochner on Steroids and
Democracy on Life Support 51-54 (2010) (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 1685459, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id= 1685459 (claiming that decisions
protecting political speech from abridgment shared same ideological premises as Lochner).
17. A LexisNexis search in May 20 II of Supreme Court decisions between 193 8 and the present
located seventy-four citations of Lochner. A LexisNexis search of Supreme Court decisions between
1904 and 1937 inclusive located seventy-six citations, including one in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1957), which of course overruled Adkins and thus disapproved Lochner.
18. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166-67 (1996) (Souter, 1., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's opinion supporting sovereign immunity is in line with the kind of judicial
standards in Lochner); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's trimester framework was a kind of judicial legislation similar to that exemplified by
Lochner).
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and liberty of contract. 19 To be sure, no Justice has expressly invoked
Lochner in the Sherman Act context. At the same time, the Court and
numerous individual Justices have embraced Standard Oil as well as the
Rule of Reason it announced. 20 Moreover, since Justice Harlan issued a
lone dissent from the original decision, 21 no Justice has suggested that
Standard Oil was incorrect or argued that Section 1 bans reasonable
restraints. Finally, courts have continued to rely on Standard Oil for certain
subsidiary principles of the Rule of Reason, including the power of courts
to adjust antitrust doctrine in light of changed economic circumstances and
understandings. 22 As a result, one of the most notorious decisions in
constitutional law is alive and well, repackaged in the Sherman Act's most
important decision.
III. STANDARD OIL'S LOCHNERIZED RULE OF REASON
Some scholars have previously noted Standard Oil's reliance on
Lochner-like reasoning, and with good cause. 23 The decision is brimming
with favorable references to freedom of contract and its influence on
various sources of law governing trade restraints. For instance, to ascertain
the meaning of the term "restraint of trade" employed in Section 1, the
Court embarked on a lengthy exegesis of English authorities. 24 Thus, the
Court explained that all trade restraints had been unenforceable during the
fifteenth century, but that English courts reversed course in the eighteenth
century "[i]n the interest of the freedom of individuals to contract" and thus
required enforcement of restraints that were "partial in its operation" and
19. See infra Part ill.
20. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
21. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 82-106 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
22. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act
adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself,
and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890" (citing
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51--60)). See also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (citing
Business Electronics for this proposition).
23. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: 1888-1992, at 56-58 (1996)
("The Standard Oil (1911) opinion's Rule of Reason can be understood as closing Lochner's circle of
individual liberty .... "); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 146-48 (1988) (concluding that
Standard Oil read the term "restraint of trade" in light of the common law and so as not to infringe
liberty of contract); Edward S. Corwin, The Anti-Trust Acts and the Constitution, 18 VA. L. REV. 355,
368-70 (1932) (criticizing Standard Oil for its reliance on liberty of contract when announcing the Rule
of Reason); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL L. REV.
77, 83-86 (tracing the role of liberty of contract in early Sherman Act case law, particularly Standard
Oil).
24. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51.
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"otherwise reasonable." 25 Moreover, England had deprived the Crown of
the ability to grant state-enforced monopolies "because of their restriction
upon individual freedom of contract and their injury to the public. " 26 That
injury took three possible forms: (1) the power to fix prices, (2) the power
to limit "production," and (3) the "deterioration in quality of the
monopolized article.'m The Court also recounted how Parliament had at
one time banned "forestalling, regrating and engrossing," that is, private
efforts to corner a market, because such abuses of the right to contract
might purportedly produce a monopoly or its consequences.28 The Court
noted, however, with approval that "more accurate economic conceptions"
caused a repeal of such statutes because they had come to ban exercises of
the right to contract that, instead of causing harm, had "fructif[ied] and
develop[ed] trade." 29 By the late nineteenth century, when Congress passed
the Sherman Act, "freedom to contract and to abstain from contracting, and
to exercise every reasonable right incident thereto, became the rule in the
English law.''30 This freedom was not unlimited, as it did not include the
freedom to restrain trade unreasonably or to "restrain the free course of
trade" with contracts motivated by a "wrongful purpose. "31 A restraint was
"unreasonable" if it produced monopoly or the consequences of
monopoly. 32
American law, the Court said, reflected the same commitments to
liberty of contract, qualified in the same manner, as English law. 33 Section
1 of the Sherman Act embraced and incorporated this defmition of restraint
25. /d.
26. !d. at 54. The Court buttressed its historical understanding of monopolies by reproducing
Lord Coke's statement that a monopoly restrains the "freedom or liberty" of subjects "in their lawful
trade," id. at 51, and by quoting William Hawkins's statement that where monopoly is present the
subject is "restrained from any freedom of manufacturing or trading which he had before," id. at 51-52
(punctuation omitted).
27. /d. at 52.
28. /d.
29. /d. at 55-56. The Court went on to explain that the repeal of statutes against forestalling,
regrating, and engrossing rested on the "truisms" that "the course of trade could not be made free by
obstructing it, and that an individual's right to trade could not be protected by destroying such right."
/d. at 56. The views of one contemporary commentator reflected these more accurate conceptions. See
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 238 (4th ed.
1827) ("The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be compared to the popular terrors and
suspicions of witchcraft.").
30. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 56.
31. /d.
32. /d. at 52-58.
33. /d. at 56-58.
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of trade, and thus did not limit the "right to make and enforce contracts,
whether resulting from combination or otherwise" unless those contracts
"unduly restrain[ed] interstate or foreign commerce."34 Instead, the statute
empowered federal courts to employ "reason" to determine whether a given
restraint (Section 1) or practice (Section 2) contravened the public policy
embodied in the Act, that is, whether the restraint or conduct produced a
monopoly or its consequences. 35 Indeed, the Court concluded, enforcement
of liberty of contract, combined with a ban on agreements that abused that
right, would prevent the emergence of monopoly.
[T]he omission [from the Sherman Act] of any direct prohibition against
monopoly in the concrete ... indicates a consciousness that the freedom
of the individual right to contract when not unduly or improperly
exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly,
since the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting
from the right to freely contract was the means by which monopoly
would be inevitably prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power
imposed it and no right to make unlawful contracts having a
monopolistic tendency were permitted. In other words, that freedom to
contract was the essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to
contract. 36

Any broader application of the Act would be "destructive of all right to
contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever as to subjects
embraced in interstate trade or commerce."37
Finally, as if to remove any possible doubt, just two weeks later the
Court, in United States v. American Tobacco Co., reaffirmed Standard
Oil's rationale, and reiterated that the Rule of Reason applies to Section 2
as well. 38 In so doing, the Court explained Standard Oil's rationale in the
following terms:
[The Standard Oil Court exercised] the duty to interpret which inevitably
arose from the general character of the term "restraint of trade" [that]
required that the words restraint of trade should be given a meaning
which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render
difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of
interstate commerce .... 39

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Oil held

ld. at 60.
Jd. at 6<H51.
Jd. at 62.
Jd. at 63.
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
ld. at 180. See also id. at 181 ("[G]iving to the statute a reasonable construction, [Standard
that] the words 'restraint of trade' did not embrace all those normal and usual contracts
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The Court also explained that adherence to "the standard of the rule of
reason" was:
[S]o plainly required in order to give effect to the remedial purposes
which the act under consideration contemplates, and to prevent that act
from destroying all liberty of contract and all substantial right to trade,
and thus causing the act to be at war with itself by annihilating the
fundamental right of freedom to trade .... 40

Thus, like the states, Congress was, as the Court held in other contexts,41
bound to respect liberty of contract, and the Court read the Sherman Act as
though Congress had done exactly that. 42
Over a decade later, in United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., the
Court reiterated Standard Oil's conclusion that the Act did not outlaw
"normal and useful contracts" because doing so would abridge liberty of
contract. 43 Justice McReynolds, an ardent proponent of liberty of contract,
wrote for a unanimous Court:
[The Sherman Act] did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal
and useful contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods,
whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose ....
The words "restraint of trade" should be given a meaning which would
not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not
impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate
commerce-the free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute
to protect. 44

The Court also read the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") Act, both passed in response to Standard Oil, in the
same manner, as not to ban "ordinary" or "usual" contracts or business
essential to individual freedom and the right to make which were necessary in order that the course of
trade might be free .... ").
40. /d. at 180.
41. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908) (voiding a Congressional ban
on contracts binding railroad employees not to join unions despite Congress's authority to regulate
interstate transportation).
42. Cf United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (reading Sherman Act so as not to
reach manufacturing given Court's previous holding that states had exclusive authority over such
activity).
43. United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371,388-89 (1923).
44. /d. (quoting American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 179-80) (discussing and reaffirming
Standard Oil). Moreover, just three years after Standard Oil, the Court reiterated the decision's
conclusion that the Sherman Act did not "reach normal and usual contracts incident to lawful purposes
and intended to further legitimate trade." E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
u.s. 600,609-10 (1914).
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practices. 45 In Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, for instance, Justice
McReynolds rejected the Commission's argument that tying was an "unfair
method of competition," concluding instead that "[i]f real competition is to
continue, the right of the individual to exercise reasonable discretion in
respect of his own business methods must be preserved."46
Some have claimed that Standard Oil's reliance on liberty of contract
was a shift from prior, more interventionist case law. 47 Echoing Justice
Harlan's Standard Oil dissent, these scholars claim or imply that early
decisions such as United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass 'n,48 United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass 'n, 49 and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 50 ignored liberty of contract and simply banned all restraints of
trade. 51 Others have made a related suggestion that these decisions
subordinated liberty of contract to Congress's commerce power, holding
that the latter somehow trumped the former. 52
45. See FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923) ("[The FTC] has no general
authority to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods or to
prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the conflict for advantage called competition. The
great purpose of both statutes [the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act] was to advance the public interest
by securing fair opportunity for the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest
desire for gain. And to this end it is essential that those who adventure their time, skill, and capital
should have large freedom of action in the conduct of their own affairs."); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 270--78 (1965) (describing the passage of the Clayton and FTC Acts as
reactions to Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason).
46. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,428-29 (1920), abrogated by FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316 (1966).
47. See, e.g., PERITZ,supra note 23, at 50--58 (treating Standard Oil as a departure from previous
decisions); SKLAR, supra note 23, at 127-46 (contending that pre-1911 Sherman Act case law
minimized the importance of liberty of contract by rejecting the common law's enforcement of
reasonable restraints of trade and characterizing Standard Oil's Rule of Reason as a departure from this
case law); Corwin, supra note 23, at 366--67 (discussing Standard Oil as a "clash" with prior decisions);
James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and
Antitrust Analysis: 1880--1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 306-09 (1989) (describing Justice White's
departure from a "rigid" line between "direct restraint" and "indirect restraint" to a more ambiguous
standard as a substantial analytic shift); David Million, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1288 n.314 (1988) (arguing that prior decisions potentially limited all contracts,
contrary to the Rule of Reason in Standard Oil).
48. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
49. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
50. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
51. See supra note 4 7 and accompanying text.
52. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836--1937, at 293-95 (1991)
("[Adcryston Pipe] completely disassociated the classical concern with liberty of contract from the
Sherman Act's concern about elimination of competition. If a restraint was within the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and thus within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, then
liberty of contract did not apply."); May, supra note 47, at 305 (contending that the only question
before the Court in Joint Traffic was the scope of the commerce power).
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Both arguments have some superficial plausibility. The opinions in
Trans-Missouri Freight and Joint Traffic held that a ban on agreements
setting reasonable prices did not abridge liberty of contract, 53 thus rejecting
arguments to the contrary in Justice White's dissent in Trans-Missouri
Freight and by attorneys for Joint Traffic Association. 54 Moreover, all three
decisions preceded Lochner, raising the possibility that the Court discerned
the meaning of the Sherman Act without regard to liberty of contract.
Finally, some language in the Court's Addyston Pipe opinion seems to
suggest that the commerce power provides Congress with greater leeway
over private contracts than the ordinary police power, and that liberty of
contract must thereby yield to the Sherman Act. 55
Closer analysis, however, reveals that these decisions did not reach as
far as others have claimed and were in fact entirely consistent with
Standard Oil's subsequent invocation of liberty of contract as the principle
controlling interpretation and implementation of the Sherman Act. Eight
years before Lochner, and during the same month as Trans-Missouri
Freight, Justice Peckham declared, for a unanimous Court in Allgeyer v.
Lousiana, that the due process clause protects liberty of contract against
abridgments outside the police power, confirming what the Court had
previously suggested. 56 Indeed, on the New York Court of Appeals, Justice
Peckham had authored an opinion voiding a statute prohibiting firms from
providing free products to induce the purchase of others, holding that such
regulation infringed the liberty of traders and exceeded the police power. 57
He also dissented from the court's holding that New York could regulate
collusive prices charged by floating grain elevators, criticizing Munn v.
Illinois, 58 and referring to such regulation as "vicious in its nature, [and]
communistic in its tendency." 59
53. See Trans-Mo. Freight, !66 U.S. at 340; Joint Traffic Ass 'n, 171 U.S. at 572-73.
54. Trans-Mo. Freight, !66 U.S. at 344-55 (White, 1., dissenting); Joint Traffic Ass 'n, 171 U.S.
at 565-67 (recounting the defendants' liberty of contract argument).
55. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229-30 ("[T]he provision regarding the liberty of the citizen
is, to some extent, limited by the commerce clause of the Constitution .... The power of Congress over
this subject seems to us much more important and necessary than the liberty of the citizen to enter into
contracts of the nature above mentioned ...." (emphasis added)).
56. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 59! (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61
(1887) (discussing the right to manufacture and sell as an aspect of liberty protected by the due process
clause). See also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (tracing the origin
of post-Civil War substantive due process to Mugler).
57. People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 345-46 (N.Y. 1888).
58. Munn v. illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
59. People ex rei. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682,688,695 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting).
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Justice Peckham, who of course would also author Lochner in 1905,
authored the Court's five major antitrust decisions between 1897 and
1899. 60 Any claim that these decisions ignored liberty of contract would
imply that Justice Peckham abandoned deeply held views so as to validate
an expansive Sherman Act, only to re-embrace such liberty in Lochner. On
the contrary, Justice Peckham repeatedly crafted decisions consistent with
the contractual liberty he embraced in Allgeyer, Lochner, and his New
York opinions. In Trans-Missouri Freight, for instance, the defendants did
not raise a liberty of contract argument, instead arguing that a ban on all
price fixing by railroads would create such absurd consequences that
Congress could not have intended such a result. 61 Rejecting this argument,
Justice Peckham emphasized that the defendants had received special
benefits and privileges from the state, including the power of eminent
domain and grants of land, and thus were subject to more extensive
regulation than ordinary businesses.62 Thus, he said, "the impolicy" of
banning such price fixing was not so clear as to justify reading an exception
into the Act. 63 This rationale also blunted the force of Justice White's
dissent, which did invoke liberty of contract. 64 After all, even strong
proponents of liberty of contract conceded that states had greater latitude to
regulate prices of firms that received special privileges, including the
power of eminent domain, which enhanced their market power. 65
60. These five decisions were: Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. 211; Anderson v. United States, 171
U.S. 604 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States,
171 U.S. 578 (1898); and United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
61. See Trans-Mo. Freight, 166 U.S. at 340 ("[W]e are asked to read into the act by way of
judicial legislation an exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the Goverrunent,
and this is to be done upon the theory that the impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be
supposed Congress intended the natural import of the language that it used."). Cf Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892) (rejecting the statute's plain language in light of
allegedly absurd consequences).
62. See Trans-Mo. Freight, 166 U.S. at 335-36.
63. !d. at 340 (''That impolicy is not so clear, nor are the reasons for the exception so potent as to ·
permit us to interpolate an exception into the language of the act, and thus to materially alter its
meaning and effect.").
64. !d. at 354 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's interpretation would "work an
enormous injustice and operate to the undue restraint of the liberties of the citizen"). Justice White also
argued that the majority's interpretation would, "if it does not destroy, at least gravely impair[], both the
liberty of the individual to contract and the freedom to trade." !d. at 355.
65. • See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrnst in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1, 5556 (1999) (noting that the grant of eminent domain power conferred additional power to regulate the
prices of recipients under the dominant political economy of the time); T.M. Cooley, State Regulation
of Corporate Profits, 322 N. AM. REv. 205, 209-11 (1883) (concluding that privileges accorded to
railroads rendered them subject to price regulation that would not be appropriate in other industries);
Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, I PRINCETON R. 233, 249-55 (1878)
("[I]t would be strange indeed if the law in giving could not limit its gift."). See also Smyth v. Ames,
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The defendants in Joint Traffic argued strenuously that TransMissouri's reading of the statute would infringe Allgeyer's liberty of
contract by banning "ordinary contracts and combinations."66 Instead of
rejecting any role for contractual liberty in determining the scope of
antitrust regulation, as some have suggested, Justice Peckham instead
conceded that the commerce power did not include "the right to destroy or
impair" liberty of contract. 67 Moreover, he concluded that the statute did
not purport to reach the "ordinary contracts and combinations" protected by
liberty of contract. 68 Echoing his opinion in Hopkins v. United States,
released the same day, Justice Peckham opined that the Act only banned
"direct restraints" of interstate commerce, leaving so-called indirect
restraints, that is, ordinary contracts and combinations, unscathed. 69
The defendants themselves, however, had not entered into indirect
restraints, but had restrained interstate commerce directly. To back this
conclusion, Justice Peckham emphasized that the defendants had received
public franchises from various states-franchises that included the eminent
domain power. 70 Interstate transportation pursuant to such franchises fell
within the jurisdiction of Congress, he said, which could attach certain
conditions to such grants, even though individual states were the grantors. 71
"Ordinary freedom of contract" did not empower the defendant railroads
169 U.S. 466, 545-46 (1897) ("A corporation maintaining a public highway, although it owns the
property it employs for accomplishing public objects, must be held to have accepted its rights,
privileges, and franchises subject to the condition that the government creating it, or the government
within whose limits it conducts its business, may, by legislation, protect the people against unreasonable
charges for the services rendered by it.").
66. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505,566 (1898).
67. !d. at 571-72 ("The [commerce] power, however, does not carry with it the right to destroy
or impair those limitations and guarantees which are also placed in the Constitution, [including liberty
of contract] .... " (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894))).
68. !d. at 567-68.
69. !d. at 566-68 (responding to defendants' assertion that, as construed in Trans-Missouri
Freight, the Sherman Act banned "ordinary contracts and combinations" protected by liberty of
contract). Justice Peckham continued
An agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an
individual or corporation, with no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate
commerce, ... is not, as we think, covered by the act, although the agreement may indirectly
and remotely affect that commerce .... "[T]he act of congress must have a reasonable
construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men
that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce,
and, possibly, to restrain it."
!d. at 568 (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578,600 (1898)).
70. !d. at 569-71.
71. !d. at 570.
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"to combine as one consolidated and powerful association for the purpose
of stifling competition among themselves, and of thus keeping their rates
and charges higher than they might otherwise be under the laws of
competition.'m
Moreover, in Addyston Pipe, joined by the Joint Traffic dissenters,
including Justice White, the Court reiterated that the Sherman Act banned
only "direct restraints" and unanimously held that a cartel arrangement
creating prices well above cost, including a reasonable rate of return,
"directly restrain[ ed]" interstate commerce.7 3 In so doing, the Court
rejected the defendants' claim that the commerce power did not extend to
private restraints but instead only reached those direct restraints imposed
by states. 74 Adoption of the defendants' position, the Court said, would
mean that regulation of such restraints would fall to individual states, who
would regulate or not regulate such restraints according to their "own
particular interest."75 Addressing the defendants' liberty of contract claim,
Justice Peckham concluded that private liberty of contract did not include
the right to enter "contracts of the nature above mentioned" and thus to
impose direct restraints on interstate commerce that are analogous to public
regulations of such commerce. 76 The restraints before the Court were
direct, he said, because they raised prices above the competitive level. 77
In both Addyston Pipe and Joint Traffic, the reach of the commerce

clause defined the proper reach of the Sherman Act and thus the limits of
liberty of contract. 78 The converse was equally true, however, as liberty of
contract principles informed, and limited, the definition of "direct
restraint." 79 More precisely, doctrines defming the domain of "liberty of
72. !d. at 570--71.
73. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-41 (1899) (reproducing and
relying upon findings from Judge Taft's Sixth Circuit opinion that market structure and transportation
costs facilitated above-cost cartel pricing), aff'g 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1899).
74. !d. at 228-35.
75. !d. at 231.
76. !d. at 229-30 ("If certain kinds of private contracts do directly, as already stated, limit or
restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the power of Congress reach those
contracts just the same as if the legislation of some State had enacted the provisions contained in them?
The private contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their effect upon interstate commerce as would
the legislation of a single State of the same character.").
77. !d. at 235-38 ("The facts thus set forth show conclusively that the effect of the combination
was to enhance prices beyond a sum which was reasonable.")
78. HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, at 294-95.
79. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (concluding that
"ordinary contracts and combinations" protected by liberty of contract are "indirect restraints" and thus
beyond the scope ofthe Sherman Act); Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230 ('The power of Congress over
this subject seems to us much more important and necessary than the liberty of the citizen to enter into
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contract" and the "commerce power" were symbiotic, with neither
dominating the other. 80 Instead, common precepts about the appropriate
scope of regulatory power simultaneously informed each doctrinal
category. In other words, a restraint was "direct" if it impacted interstate
commerce in a way that produced the sort of harm that justified regulatory
intervention under the classical economic paradigm that informed liberty of
contract jurisprudence. 81 As a result, liberty of contract still retained
independent force vis-a-vis the commerce power, a fact confirmed by
decisions outside the antitrust context. 82 Far from ignoring liberty of
contract, Justice Peckham sketched a Sherman Act framework designed to
safeguard agreements otherwise protected by ordinary freedom of contract
by leaving so-called "indirect" restraints unscathed. 83 Indeed, if anything,
Justice Peckham's account of the scope of the Sherman Act was less
contracts of the nature above mentioned ...." (emphasis added)). The negative implication of the
italicized and qualifying language is that Congress does not have authority to ban any contract simply
because the contract falls within the commerce power.
80. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 143-44 (1998) (contending that late nineteenth-century commerce
clause jurisprudence was strongly influenced by conceptual categories developed in the liberty of
contract context).
81. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, at 200-01 (explaining how the principle of externality
regulation informed liberty of contract jurisprudence).
82. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (voiding a Congressional ban on
contracts binding railroad employees not to join unions despite Congress's authority to regulate
interstate transportation).
83. See Meese, supra note 65, at 55 (discussing authorities supporting the proposition that the
grant of eminent domain power conferred additional power to regulate prices charged by recipients);
William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REv. I, 46-47
(1991) (explaining that franchises granted the defendants an advantage by precluding market entry by
potential new competitors). Professor Hovenkamp has offered a somewhat different account of Joint
Traffic, contending that the Court relied upon implied limitations in the franchises the railroads had
received from various states. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, at 294 ("One could not presume that the
franchises entitled [the railroads] to behave anticompetitively."). He does not, however, identify any
legal text granting such franchises or any portion of such text limiting the pricing discretion of the
recipients. Nor did the Joint Traffic opinion itself claim that the states that had granted the franchises
meant to limit the pricing discretion of the railroads with respect to interstate commerce. Indeed, states
likely did not possess the authority to regulate rates for the interstate shipment of goods. See TIL Cent.
Ry. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 153 (1896) (invalidating a law prescribing the location of stops for
interstate trains); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. lllinois, 118 U.S. 557, 576-77 (1886) (voiding
state regulation of interstate rail rates). Finally, even if states did possess the authority to regulate the
rates for interstate rail transportation, it seems unlikely that they would exercise that authority to protect
out-of-state shippers from unreasonably high rates imposed by in-state carriers. See N. Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 352 (1904) (banning a merger that would have created a monopoly
between two interstate railroads despite the approval by the state where the merging firms were
incorporated); Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 231 (recognizing that states would regulate or not trade
restraints according to their "own particular interest").
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interventionist than that sketched by Standard Oil. For example, Justice
Peckham placed so-called indirect restraints-including mergers, the
formation of partnerships, and covenants not to compete-beyond the
scope of the Sherman Act altogether, even if such restraints would have
been unreasonable under the Standard Oil formulation. 84
It is also noteworthy that Judge Taft, whose Sixth Circuit Addyston
Pipe opinion was an important pillar of pre-Standard Oil law, expressly
opined in a 5000-word letter to Congress that Standard Oil's Rule of
Reason did not alter the standards articulated by Joint Traffic or his own
Addyston Pipe opinion. 85 Indeed, in his post-presidency book on the
Sherman Act, Taft announced that he had challenged Standard Oil's
detractors to identify a single scenario in which the Rule of Reason would
fail to condemn a restraint properly condemned by pre-Standard Oil case
law. 86 No one, Taft said, had taken up the challenge. 87 More than fifteen
years later, Chief Justice Taft repeated this message, declaring in a
unanimous opinion that Standard Oil merely "confirmed" the best reading
of Addyston Pipe, Joint Traffic, and Trans-Missouri Freight. 88

Still, Justice Peckham had declined to embrace the Rule of Reason
that Justice White had so vigorously endorsed in his Trans-Missouri
Freight dissent. That task fell to Justice Brewer, concurring in the famous
84. Cf N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 400-ll (Holmes, J., joined by Fuller, C.J., White & Peckham,
JJ., dissenting) (contending that merger to monopoly was not a restraint of trade). By contrast, Judge
Taft's Sixth Circuit Addyston Pipe opinion concluded that partial, ancillary restraints of interstate
commerce-indirect and thus lawful restraints according to Justice Peckham-would violate the
Sherman Act if unreasonable. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir.
1899), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
85. See President William Howard Taft, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1911)
("These cases of restraint of trade that the court excepted from the operation of the statute [in TransMissouri Freight and Joint Traffic] were instances which, at common law, would have been called
reasonable. In the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases, therefore, the court merely adopted the tests of the
common law, and in defining exceptions to the literal application of the statute, only substituted for the
test of being incidental or indirect, that of being reasonable, and this, without varying in the slightest the
actual scope and effect of the statute. In other words, all the cases under the statute which have now
been decided would have been decided the same way if the court had originally accepted in its
construction the rule at common law."); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT 266-67 (1956) (describing Taft's reaction to the Standard Oil
decision and its critics).
86. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 94-95 (1914).
87. !d.; Taft, supra note 85 ("The most extreme critics cannot instance a case that ought to be
condemned under the statute which is not brought within its terms as thus construed [in Standard Oil
and American Tobacco].").
88. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 460-61 (1927) (Taft, C.J.) (concluding that
Standard Oil's Rule of Reason was consistent with earlier decisions such as Joint Traffic, TransMissouri Freight, and Taft's own Addyston Pipe decision); Taft, supra note 85.
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Northern Securities Co. decision. Conceding that he had joined Justice
Peckham's previous majorities, Justice Brewer reiterated his view that
these cases were correctly decided. 89 He opined, however, that "in some
respects the reasons given for the judgments cannot be sustained."90 In
particular, he said, "the ruling should have been that the contracts there
presented were unreasonable restraints of interstate trade, and as such
within the scope of the act," and that the Act only proscribed those
"contracts which were in direct restraint of trade, unreasonable, and against
public policy."91 Such a construction was necessary in part because "the
general language of the act is also limited by the power which each
individual has to manage his own property and determine the place and
manner of its investment. Freedom of action in these respects is among the
inalienable rights of every citizen."92 Standard Oil simply elaborated and
rearticulated Justice Brewer's conclusion. 93

The Supreme Court overruled Lochner sub silentio in 1937, holding
that minimum wages for women do not violate the due process clause. 94
Since that time the Supreme Court has repeatedly gone out of its way to
repudiate the vision of contractual liberty and limits on state regulatory
authority that animated Lochner. 95 Indeed, since the retirement of Justice
McReynolds in 1941, no member of the Court has endorsed meaningful
89. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 360 (Brewer, J., concurring).
90. !d. at 361.
91. !d.
92. !d.
93. Although Justice Brewer supplied the fifth vote for the result in the case, no other Justice
expressly endorsed his Rule of Reason. For instance, in dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice
Peckham, Justice Holmes, and Chief Justice Fuller, contended that the Court's application of the Act
exceeded the scope of Congress's commerce power. See id. at 364-400 (White, J., dissenting)
("Congress was without power to regulate the acquisition and ownership of the stock in question .... ").
Moreover, Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Peckham, Justice White, and Chief Justice Fuller, argued
that the Act did not reach mere mergers that combined the assets of two previously competing firms, a
result consistent with Joint Traffic's conclusion that such a transaction was an indirect restraint of trade
and thus beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. See id. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (viewing the
effect of the purchase of shares as "such a remote result").
94. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). Perhaps ironically, this pillar of post-Lochner
jurisprudence sustained a statute that contravened the equal protection clause by discriminating against
women and thus pricing some women out of the labor market.
95. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,730 (1963) (sustaining a ban on "debt-adjusting"
by nonlawyers without determining whether the ban furthered any rational public purpose); Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1955) (upholding a state Jaw that banned
advertising for the sale of eyeglasses and lenses against a due process challenge); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938) (upholding the federal Filled Milk Act, which
prohibited the shipment of purportedly adulterated milk in interstate commerce).
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protection for liberty of contract. 96 During the same period, numerous
justices have authored or joined opinions criticizing liberty of contract in
general and Lochner in particular. 97
At the same time, the Court has repeatedly endorsed Standard Oil and
its Rule of Reason numerous times in the ten decades since the decision.
Over the past three decades, for instance, the Supreme Court has cited
Standard Oil's Rule of Reason several times, often in unanimous or near
unanimous decisions. 98 Additional decisions invoked the Rule of Reason
and its antiliteral consequences without expressly mentioning Standard
Oi/. 99 Major lower court decisions have invoked the Rule of Reason as
well. 100 No Justice, aside from the elder Justice Harlan, has questioned the
correctness of Standard Oil or its Rule of Reason.
There is a similar disconnect within the community of antitrust
scholars. Here again, most scholars endorse Standard Oil and the Rule of
Reason as the appropriate approach to the Sherman Act. 101 Very few,
96. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (Douglas, J.) (rejecting
Lochner and its progeny as an appropriate guide to substantive due process analysis).
97. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760-61 (1997) (endorsing the enterprise of
substantive due process while at the same time rejecting Lochner and meaningful protection for liberty
of contract); Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (same).
98. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1998); California v. Am. Stores Co., 495
U.S. 271, 286 (1990); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723, 732 (1988); Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 288 (1985); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Nat'!
Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Several decisions from a more
interventionist era also invoked Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (referring to Standard Oil as a "landmark case" and relying on
the decision for the proposition that some restraints, because of their "nature or character," were
"unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the statute"); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. I, 4-5 (1958) (invoking Standard Oil for the proposition that the Sherman Act
bans only unreasonable restraints).
99. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) ("While
§ I could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts, the Court has never 'taken a literal approach to [its]
language.' Rather, the Court has repeated time and again that § I 'outlaw[s] only unreasonable
restraints.'" (citations omitted)); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman
Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement 'in restraint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints. As a consequence, most antitrust claims are
analyzed under a 'rule of reason. "'(citations omitted)).
100. E.g., United States v. Microsoft, Inc., 253 F.3d 34,59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en bane).
101. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 3341 (1978) [hereinafter BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX] (endorsing Standard Oil's overarching principle
while critiquing the Court's application of it in the particular case); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN &
WARRENS. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 217-18 (2d ed. 2006)
(praising Standard Oil as an "antitrust classic"); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
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however, recognize the connection between Standard Oil and Lochner's
version of substantive due process. 102 Robert Bork's nontreatment of the
connection is illustrative. On the one hand, Bork carefully dissects the
formative-era case law and concludes, as do other scholars including
myself, that Standard Oil's Rule of Reason was consistent with the tests
announced by then-Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe and Justice Peckham in
Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe. 103 He also endorses all such decisions as
exemplifying the appropriate approach to antitrust questions. 104 At the
same time, his discussion completely ignores the role that Lochner, liberty
of contract, and substantive due process played in these early decisions. 105
Bork took this approach despite the fact that both Joint Traffic and
Addyston Pipe, for instance, entertained liberty of contract challenges to the
Act. 106 Moreover, while he discusses the Harlan plurality opinion and the
Holmes dissent in Northern Securities, he does not mention Justice
Brewer's controlling concurrence, which, as explained earlier, expressly
invoked the constitution's protection for "[f]reedom of action" over one's
property as militating in favor of a narrower Rule of Reason approach to
the statute. 107 While one can only speculate regarding the cause of this
oversight, it should be noted that Bork has always been a vociferous
opponent of the enterprise of substantive due process; perhaps this hostility,
combined with the general opprobrium heaped on Lochner, led Bork to
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 801-05 (1965) [hereinafter Bork, The
Rule ofReason] (noting the "major virtues" of Standard Oil, despite the existence of some flaws).
102. Rudolph Peritz, of course, is one exception. See PERITZ, supra note 23, at 56-58 (1996)
("The Standard Oil ( 1911) opinion's Rule of Reason can be understood as closing Lochner's circle of
individual liberty .... ").
103. See Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra note 101, at 785 ("Despite the near universal opinion
that Chief Justice White fathered the modem rule of reason in his 1911 Standard Oil and American
Tobacco opinions, a careful reading of Justice Peckham's opinions indicates that the honor ofpatemity
belongs instead to him."). Bork continued by arguing that "White's acceptance of Trans-Missouri and
Joint Traffic and his own three-part test result in a rule of reason largely, if not completely, convertible
either to Peckham's test of direct and indirect restraints or Taft's test of ancillary and non-ancillary
restraints." !d. at 805. See also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 101, at 217-18 (concluding that
Standard Oil did not depart significantly from previous decisions).
104. Bork, The Rule ofReason, supra note 101. at 785-805.
105. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 101, at 217-19 (discussing Standard Oil without
mentioning Lochner or liberty of contract).
I 06. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 232 (1899); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 573 (1898).
107. Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra note 101, at 806-14; see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197,361 (1904) (Brewer, J., concurring).
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minimize the role that liberty of contract played in inspiring the approach
he himself embraced. 108
IV. MODERN CONTROVERSIES
Although Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason are a century old, there
is not universal agreement about the Rule's content. This section examines
two sources of controversy, namely, how to define "consumer welfare" and
whether courts should balance the beneficial impact of a restraint against its
harms or, instead, simply decline to condemn a restraint that is necessary to
produce benefits.
A. THE MEANING OF "CONSUMER WELFARE"

Quoting Robert Bork, the Supreme Court has said that Congress
passed the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription." 109
Unfortunately, the term "consumer welfare" does not define itself, and
antitrust scholars have advocated two different defmitions of this term. 110
Bork has argued that courts should equate "consumer welfare" with total
economic welfare, that is, the welfare of all individuals in society,
regardless of whether they purchase products governed by a challenged
restraint or other practice. 111 Though often associated with the so-called
Chicago school of antitrust, Bork's approach actually replicated the
approach previously endorsed by the Harvard school, headed by Edward
108. It should be noted that other contemporary work examining Standard Oil and earlier
decisions also fastidiously avoided any mention of Lochner. See LETWIN, supra note 85, at 293-96
(listing a table of over I 00 cases discussed in the work with no mention of Lochner).
109. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("[Debates in Congress] suggest that
Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription."' (quoting BORK, ANTITRUST
PARADOX, supra note 101, at 66)).
110. See Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMP. POL'Y
INT'L 29, 31 (2006) (explaining these two different welfare approaches).
Ill. BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 101, at 50-89 (arguing on various grounds that
courts should treat maximizing total economic welfare as the exclusive goal of the Sherman Act). See
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2, 9-32 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that the economic theory of
monopoly and the resulting misallocation of resources provides the only sound basis for antitrust policy,
and that courts should prefer monopoly over competition when the former results in greater efficiency
in a Kaldor-Hicksian sense); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. & EcON. 7, 11-13 (1966) (examining legislative history and concluding that, in passing the
Sherman Act, Congress favored a "consumer welfare" framework, which Bork equated with total
economic welfare); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85
N.Y.U. L. REv. 659, 668--69 (2010) (discussing various authorities advancing the "total welfare"
approach).
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Mason, Donald Turner, Carl Kaysen, and Phillip Areeda. 112 Others,
however, take issue with the Harvard/Chicago account regarding the
meaning of the statute and instead would equate "consumer welfare" with
the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market occupied by the proponent
of the challenged conduct. 1 13 Under this approach, a restraint, a merger, or
any other transaction that increases overall economic welfare nonetheless
contravenes the Act if it raises prices in the relevant market.
Although they have had over a century to do so, courts have not
settled on a particular definition of "consumer welfare" relevant to
Sherman Act adjudication. Thus, under Section 2 of the Act, courts have
embraced the Harvard/Chicago approach, holding that "competition on the
merits" such as the realization of economies of scale and associated abovecost pricing is lawful per se, without regard to whether such conduct results
in higher prices for purchasers in the relevant market. 114 Moreover, this
112. See Meese, supra note 111, at 690--708. In particular, the Harvard school argued that socalled competition on the merits should be lawful per se, regardless of whether such conduct raised or
lowered prices in the relevant market. See id. at 704. These scholars also argued that the Sherman Act
should not ban restraints that produced a "reasonable" degree of market power, that is, market power
necessary to achieve significant efficiencies, again without regard to whether the restraint in question
increased or decreased prices paid by purchasers in the relevant market. !d. at 698-702.
113. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1982) (arguing that the
legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates concern with harm to purchasers, not allocative
efficiency); Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 217 (2005) (endorsing a comparison of efficiency effects with
adverse impacts on purchasers in the relevant market); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect
on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329-36 (2006)
(endorsing the so-called consumer welfare effect standard under Section 2, whereby courts determine
whether a restraint, on balance, injures purchasers in the relevant market).
114. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223
(1993); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (lOth Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between
behavior that abuses monopoly power and that which simply "build[s] a better mousetrap"); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,274 (2d Cir. 1979) ("A firm that has lawfully acquired
a monopoly position is not barred from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing, for
example, a large and efficient factory. These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of
power over the market." (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
597 (1985))); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd,
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam); PHILLIP AREEDA &DONALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW~ 626b, at
77-78 (1978) (arguing that Section 2 should not forbid conduct that "furthers competition on the
merits" in the least restrictive manner, even if such conduct excludes rivals and obtains or maintains
monopoly power); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARRENS. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 73 (1st ed. 2000) (assuming that firms can achieve dominance by merit and
concluding that current law does not interdict such monopolies). It should be noted that the referenced
passage of the Areeda and Turner treatise addresses itself to all conduct that might monopolize a
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"total welfare" approach applies even to agreements or refusals to deal that
exclude rivals from the market and thus maintain a firm's monopoly
position, so long as the challenged practice produces significant benefits. 115
That is, contrary to the suggestion of some, courts applying Section 2 do
not balance the benefits of such restraints against harms, or otherwise seek
to ascertain whether the conduct results in higher prices than those that
existed before the practice. 11 6
Courts treat Section 1 differently, however. That is, courts have
apparently structured Section 1's Rule of Reason analysis in a manner that
equates "consumer welfare" with the welfare of purchasers in the relevant
market. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that benefits attributed to a
restraint are not even cognizable in the first place if the benefits rest on the
assumption that the restraint will increase prices. 117 Moreover, when
conducting Rule of Reason analysis, the Court has rejected a claim that
efficiencies justified an otherwise anticompetitive restraint simply because
the restraint purportedly resulted in prices that were higher than the status
quo ante. 118 Under this approach, then, Section 1 condemns any restraint
that results in higher prices than the status quo ante, even if the efficiencies
produced by the restraint outweigh any social loss that the restraint
produces. That is to say, this definition of "consumer welfare" requires
market, including concerted action such as exclusive dealing and tying contracts. See also Barak Y.
Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 429,433-35 (2012).
115. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-84 (1992);
United States v. Dentsply, 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the Eastman Kodak test to
evaluate an exclusive dealing contract that purportedly contravened Section 2); Conwood Co. v. U.S.
Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 786-88 (6th Cir. 2002) (articulating a legitimate business justification
defense in a case involving alleged business torts and exclusionary contracts); Trans Sport, Inc. v.
Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1992) (Marshall, J.) (determining that the
practice of excluding rivals from the market is lawful if supported by a legitimate business
justification); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 284 (same).
116. See Pitofsky, supra note 113, at 217 (endorsing a comparison of efficiency effects with
adverse impacts on purchasers in the relevant market); Salop, supra note 113, at 329-36 (endorsing the
so-called consumer welfare effect standard under Section 2, whereby courts determine whether a
restraint, on balance, injures purchasers in the relevant market).
117. See Nat') Soc'y of Prof' I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978) (holding that
defendants' argument that restraint was necessary to prevent low prices from undermining the quality of
engineering services simply confirmed that the agreement had an "anticompetitive purpose and effect"
because it was premised upon an assertion that the agreement would maintain or increase the price
level).
118. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-14 (1985) ("If the
NCAA's television plan produced procompetitive efficiencies, the plan would increase output and
reduce the price level of televised games."); FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS§ 3.37 (2000).
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courts to implement Section 1 of the Sherman Act in a manner that reduces
economic welfare and ultimately injures society's consumers as a class. 119
Of course, these two definitions of "consumer welfare" produce the
same result in numerous antitrust cases. 120 Both camps would ban naked
horizontal price fixing and both would condone a merger to monopoly or
other agreement that resulted in efficiencies large enough to reduce prices
or prevent their increase. Still, the two standards do require different
treatment of some restraints. For instance, the "purchaser welfare" school
would ban above-cost pricing by an efficient monopolist if such prices
deterred entry by less efficient rivals, thus resulting in higher prices than
entry by such inefficient rivals would produce. 121 By contrast, the "total
welfare" school reasons that the social gains from the monopolist's
superior efficiency would likely outweigh the harm from any misallocation
of resources resulting from an exercise of monopoly power and thus would
leave such conduct unscathed. 122
As between these two approaches, only the first, the total welfare
approach, is consistent with a Lochnerian Rule of Reason. Recall that
during the Lochner era, regulation that infringed contractual liberty or
limited the use of property only survived constitutional review if it fell
119. Cf Alan J. Meese, Section 2 and the Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean
More (GDP), 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1633, 1674-- 75 & n.261 (2012) (contending that realization of
efficiencies in one market will free up resources that can flow to other markets and thus reduce prices
paid by consumers in those markets).
120. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (1986)
("[T]he dominant theme [of the Sherman Act's legislative history] is the protection of consumers from
overcharges. This turns out to be the same program as one based on 'efficiency.' There are differences
at the margins, such as what if anything to do about price discrimination ... but the differences are not
very important.").
121. See Meese, supra note Ill, at 668 (describing the position of the "purchaser welfare"
school); Aaron S. Edlin, Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
(Einer Elhauge, ed., forthcoming Nov. 20 II), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=l078&context=aaron_edlin (endorsing this position). See also Christopher R.
Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 573 (2012) (discussing the
debates over predatory pricing).
122. Meese, supra note Ill, at 671-72 (explaining how safe harbor for "competition on the
merits" is best understood as reflecting this assumption). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as
an Antitrnst Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffi, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21-23 (1968) (explaining that
modest efficiencies will generally exceed the deadweight allocative losses resulting from a transaction
that also enhances market power); BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 101, at 107-10 (invoking
Williamson's partial equilibrium trade-off model to illustrate the inherent tradeoff between productive
efficiencies and the "deadweight loss" caused by monopolistic output reduction).
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within the police power. 123 As Herbert Hovenkamp has explained, this
authority consisted solely of the power to regulate market conduct that
produced welfare-reducing negative externalities as defined by the
Pigouvian regulatory paradigm. 124 Such externalities reflect a market
failure that occurs because high transaction costs prevent parties from
bargaining resources to their highest-valued uses, thereby resulting in a
misallocation of resources. 125 Thus, while Lochner's conception of the
police power as authorizing the correction of market failures would
authorize an antitrust policy focused on maximizing total economic
welfare-the Harvard/Chicago defmition of consumer welfare-it would
not authorize a ban on restraints that enhance the overall allocation of
productive resources and increase total economic welfare merely because
such restraints would also create market power and increase prices paid by
purchasers in the relevant market. Such restraints would not produce a
market failure subject to antitrust regulation under the Lochnerian
paradigm because parties operating in a world with zero transaction costs
would adopt the restraint in question instead of the status quo ante. 126
123. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578, 585-86 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,658-59 (1887).
124. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, at 201 ("Both [Thomas] Cooley and the Supreme Court
read into substantive due process doctrine a theory of externalities much like [A.C.] Pigou's. The Court
approved regulatory legislation if it was convinced that market exchanges produced negative
externalities for which the bargaining parties would not account."); A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND
WELFARE (1912). An instructive example of such an externality-based approach can be found in In re
Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885), where the New York Court of Appeals struck down a state ban on the
manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. Among other things, the court relied on the fact that tobacco
odor "did not extend to any of the other rooms of the tenement-house." !d. at 113. By contrast, the
Supreme Court sustained a local ban on nighttime laundry operations requiring continuous fires in
neighborhoods subject "to high winds" and consisting of "wooden buildings" because "regulations of a
strict character should be adopted to prevent the possibility of fires." Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S.
703, 708 (1885) (upholding a ban on a laundry operation for this reason).
125. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932) (examining the role
of externalities in creating market failure and possible remedies necessary to correct that failure and
"make the national dividend a maximum"). Pigou also equated "national dividend" with "economic
welfare." !d. at 31-42. See also Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, II J.L. & ECON. 67, 69-71 (1968) (explaining the connection between transaction
costs, market failure, and economic welfare, and arguing that antitrust regulation can be explained as an
effort to replicate allocation of resources that would occur in absence of bargaining costs, thereby
maximizing total welfare). See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I
(1960) (explaining that, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain resources to their
highest valued use regardless of the initial allocation of entitlements).
126. For instance, purchasers injured by a wealth-creating merger would not be willing to pay the
merging parties to forgo the transaction. Though of course, in a world with no transaction costs,
bargaining parties would have their cake and eat it too, that is, parties would bargain both for the
restraint that creates the efficiencies and for increased output, perhaps as a result of price
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Simply put, the vision of contractual liberty articulated and enforced during
the Lochner era did not view redistribution of income between market
participants as a valid justification for abridging liberty of contract or the
right of property. As Hovenkamp put it over two decades ago:
This doctrine of externalities led the Supreme Court to its decisions that
struck down regulatory legislation as well as those that upheld statutes
where qualifying externalities were found. It also explains why the Court
generally refused to tolerate inequality of bargaining power as a
qualifying public interest [that justified abridgement of contractual
liberty or property]. Inequality of bargaining power between capitalists
and laborers affected the distribution of wealth between the bargaining
parties, but the Court saw no effect on anyone else. For example, Justice
Peckham held that the bakers' hours statute in Lochner (1905) must fall
unless the plaintiffs could show a relationship between the number of
hours a baker works and the "healthful quality" of the bread he produces.
The mere fact that long hours of work were bad for bakers, who were
adults capable protecting themselves, was insufficient to justify the
regulation .... 127

Perhaps the best exemplar of such reasoning can be found in Coppage
v. Kansas. 128 In Coppage, the Court entertained a challenge to a ban on socalled yellow dog contracts, namely, agreements whereby employees
agreed not to join a union. 129 The state justified the ban in part by claiming
that employer and employee did not bargain as equals, with the result that
employers purportedly employed their unequal bargaining power to coerce
such agreements upon unwilling employees. 130 The Court replied in a
manner consistent with a market failure account of the police power. 131 The
Court did not claim that employers and employees bargained as equals but
discrimination. Antitrust regulation is not price regulation, however, and thus cannot replicate this
bargain.
127. HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, at 201-02 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62). See also Alan J.
Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due
Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 3, 19-20 (1999) (recounting other nineteenth-century
authorities equating the police power with market failure regulation).
128. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I, 12-15 (1915). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
172-74 (1908) (voiding a Congressional ban on contracts binding railroad employees not to join unions
despite Congress's authority to regulate interstate transportation).
129. See generally Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917-1932, 30
LABOR HIST. 251 (1989) (discussing the history and eventual abolition of yellow dog contracts).
130. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 16-18.
131. 1d. at 14 ("[S]o far as its title or enacting clause expresses a purpose to deal with coercion,
compulsion, duress, or other undue influence, we have no present concern with it, because nothing of
that sort is involved in this case.").
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instead conceded the assumption by the Supreme Court of Kansas that
employers possessed a bargaining advantage over employees because of
the former's ownership of greater property. 132 Still, the Court said, an
unequal distribution of property was a predictable and defensible result of
the recognition of private property and freedom of contract.
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and
will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties
negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by
circumstances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that
between employer and employee. Indeed a little reflection will show that
wherever the right of private property and the right of free contract
coexist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or less
influenced by the question whether he has much property, or little, or
none; for the contract is made to the very end that each may gain
something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which he
proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-evident that, unless all
things are held in common, some persons must have more property than
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the
necessary result of the exercise of those rights. But the Fourteenth
Amendment, in declaring that a state shall not "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law," gives to each of
these an equal sanction; it recognizes "liberty" and "property" as
coexistent human rights, and debars the states from any unwarranted
interference with either. 133

Thus, legislation that abridged liberty of contract or regulated for
example the prices charged by private businesses solely for the purpose of
redistributing income from one party to another, exceeded the scope of the
police power and thus contravened the due process clause. 134 If states or the
federal government wished to redistribute income, they had to do so the
old-fashioned way, that is, by raising taxes and spending the proceeds. 135
132. /d.at17.
133. /d.
134. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 66061 (1887) (discussing the right to manufacture "for general use or for the personal use of the maker" as
an aspect of liberty protected by the due process clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833,846 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.,joint opinion) (tracing the origin of post-Civil
War substantive due process to Mug/er). See also Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The
Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 605, 632, 637-38 (2012) (discussing no-fault
monopolization theories associated with level of prices).
135. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEx. L. REv. I, 19-20 (2003)
(explaining that the Lochner-era Court did not oppose redistribution via taxation but only redistribution
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While some might have attributed this view to Social Darwinists like
Herbert Spencer, 136 others might have found the rationale in the works of
James Madison.
To be sure, the actual record is a bit more nuanced. After all, the Court
did, in some cases, sustain price regulation, even though such regulation
abridged liberty of contract. In particular, the Court held that, despite
generalized protection for liberty of contract and private property, states
could regulate the prices of firms in industries "affected with a public
interest." 137 This small category included firms that had received special
benefits from the state conferring competitive advantages, 138 as well as
industries with characteristics, including high concentration and barriers to
entry, which facilitated collusion and thus the collective exercise of market
power. 139 Even here, however, courts policed state-imposed prices to
ensure that they were reasonable, thereby preventing the state from
reducing welfare in attempts to achieve a politically popular distribution of
via abridgments of liberty or property that fell outside the police power); Meese, supra note 127, at 51
("[F]ull and vigorous enforcement of liberty of contract still leaves the state perfectly free to assure
minimal levels of human welfare through taxing and spending."); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878 n.27 (1987) (noting Lochner's "preference for redistribution through
taxation rather than regulation"). This distinction-between abridgments that serve redistributive
purposes and redistribution via taxation and spending-seems at least implicit in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 550-55 (1923). There, the Court rejected
Congress's imposition of a minimum wage in the District of Columbia. !d. at 566. In so doing, the
Court expressly rejected the government's claim that such regulation was justified to ensure that
employees received wages sufficient to ensure their healthy subsistence. Jd. According to the Court,
employers had no greater duty to pay above-market wages to their needful employees than grocers had
to charge below-market prices to hungry customers. See id. at 558-59. Instead, the Court said, the
welfare of such needful employees and customers was the responsibility of society at large, and thus
could not justify abridging the contractual liberty of individuals and firms. See id.
136. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The [Constitution]
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
137. See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 541-43 (1892); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
126 (1876) (holding that price regulation of firms in industry "affected with a public interest" did not
offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
138. See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of.Kansas, 262 U.S. 522,535-42
(1923) (Taft, C.J.) (elaborating the principles for determining whether industries are affected with a
public interest, including the presence of state-conferred privileges and conditions conducive to
cartelization).
139. See Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535-42; Munn, 94 U.S. at 131-33 (sustaining price regulation
because there were only seven independent firms in the industry and the firms in question were actively
colluding on price thereby resulting in a "virtual monopoly"); Barry Cushman, Continuity and Change
in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (2003) (concluding that the Court
deemed fewer than half a dozen businesses to be "affected with a public interest" and thus subject to
price regulation during this period).
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the fruits of economic activity. 140 Moreover, early antitrust decisions
reached results consistent with these principles. In Joint Traffic 141 and
Trans-Missouri Freight, 142 for instance, the Court sustained application of
the Sherman Act because the defendants had received special privileges
from the state in the form of eminent domain and land grants; privileges
that conferred competitive advantages on the defendants and thus
facilitated the exercise of market power. 143 Just one year later, the Addyston
Pipe Court upheld application of the Sherman Act to a private cartel,
relying upon findings that the defendants' share of the market, combined
with barriers to entry, facilitated effective cartelization resulting in
unreasonable prices. 144
Proponents of a "purchaser welfare" approach to Section 1 could
invoke these early decisions, which Standard Oil did not purport to
overrule, in an effort to contradict a total welfare interpretation of Standard
Oil's Rule of Reason. However, formative-era antitrust decisions such as
Joint Traffic, Trans-Missouri Freight, and Addyston Pipe are entirely
consistent with a total welfare approach and thus with Lochner's antiredistributionist philosophy. Simply put, each such case involved cartel
price fixing that presumably resulted in a misallocation of resources and
deadweight loss, analogous to an externality, without any countervailing
efficiency benefits; this ultimately justified condemnation as a market
failure and reduction in total welfare under the Pigouvian paradigm. 145 To
be sure, such condemnation would be consistent with a purchaser welfare
approach, because the challenged restraints also, apparently, produced
prices above the competitive level. 146 Such coincidental consistency,
however, does not contradict or falsify the total welfare account of the
140. Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361,362-63 (1898) (holding that a legislatively imposed railroad
tariff that did not allow a fair return to regulated firms thereby deprived railroads of property without
due process of law).
141. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505,574-77 (1898).
142. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,338-41 (1897).
143. See Meese, supra note 65, at 54-55 (explaining that state grant of special privileges, such as
the power of eminent domain, thereby justified more intrusive regulation); supra notes 61-72 and
accompanying text.
144. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899) (reproducing
findings from Judge Taft's Sixth Circuit opinion that the cartel charged prices well above cost plus a
reasonable rate of return and thus above the competitive level); Meese, supra note 65, at 62-67
(explaining how Justice Peckham sustained antitrust regulation of a purely private cartel given factual
record establishing that such conduct would produce unreasonable prices); Page, supra note 83, at 4749 (explaining that franchises granted defendants an advantage by precluding market entry by potential
new competitors).
145. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (explaining "purchaser welfare" approach).
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Lochnerian Rule of Reason, particularly when one considers that era's
related constitutional barrier against redistributionist price regulation. 147
Total welfare, not purchaser welfare, is the Standard Oil way. 148
B. To BALANCE OR NOT TO BALANCE

The case law of Section 1 and Section 2 differs in another important
respect as well, namely, whether courts balance conduct's harms against its
benefits. Under Section 2, courts do not balance a practice's harms against
its benefits and determine which predominates. Instead, once a plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case of monopolization, the burden shifts to the
defendant to adduce evidence that the challenged practice produces
significant benefits or, in the words of two scholars, that the practice
"further[s] competition on the merits." 149 If a defendant can prove to the
trier of fact that such benefits exist, the defendant prevails, unless the
plaintiff can show that the defendant could achieve the same benefits by
less restrictive means. 150 While the application of a less restrictive
alternative test rests on the assumption that a restraint's benefits coexist
147. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 545-50 (1897) (holding that state regulation of a railroad
company deprived it of its property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by setting firm's prices
below a reasonable level); People ex rei. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 670, 695 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing redistributionist price regulation as "communistic in its tendency").
148. Proponents of the purchaser welfare approach might also invoke Standard Oil's own account
of the three "consequences of monopoly," the presence of which would justify condemnation under the
Rule of Reason. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (explaining the "purchaser welfare"
approach). Suffice it to say that this account of the "public policy embodied in the act" did not confront
the situation in which a practice both created market power and productive efficiencies, thereby
"fructify[ing]" and "develop[ing]" trade, thus raising the possibility that overall wealth creation would
require purchasers in a particular market to pay higher prices. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. I,
55-56 (1911). For what it might be worth, William Howard Taft, who endorsed Standard Oil's Rule of
Reason, answered the question in a way more congenial to a "total welfare" approach. See TAFT, supra
note 86, at 124 ("[The Sherman Act's aim was not] to destroy the larger businesses whose capital and
large plants enable them to produce goods cheaply, in order that small plants that cannot produce them
as cheaply may live.").
149. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) (quoting
AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 114, at ~ 626b, at 77-78). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992) (citing Aspen Skiing for the proposition that
conduct supported by a "valid business justification" cannot violate Section 2); Meese, supra note Ill,
at 710 n.261 (arguing that Robert Pitofsky's contention that Aspen Skiing requires a "balancing
approach" is incorrect).
150. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-86 (rejecting Kodak's motion for summary judgment
because the plaintiff adduced evidence that Kodak could have achieved the same benefits by less
restrictive means). See also D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in
Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 694-95 (2012) (discussing strategic private
litigation utilizing Section 2 claims).
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with harms, application of such a test does not entail actual balancing of
harms versus benefits. 151
Section 1 is a different story, however. Here the consensus among
courts and the enforcement agencies is quite clear: courts must balance any
benefits produced by a restraint against its harms, determining which
impact predominates. 152 At the same time, such balancing rarely occurs in
practice. For instance, one exhaustive, but somewhat dated, survey finds
that 84 percent of Rule of Reason cases fail because a plaintiff cannot
establish any significant anticompetitive effect in the first place and that
courts actually purported to "balance" harms against benefits in only 4
percent of cases surveyed. 153 This same survey found that, in half of the
cases that "balanced," courts found that there was no harm after all, and
that courts reached incorrect results in some of the remaining cases. 154
Finally, such balancing is, at least as a rhetorical matter, a post-1970
development. 155
A Lochnerized Rule of Reason would reject balancing, just as courts
of that era rejected balancing in other contexts. 156 During the Lochner era,
courts simply asked whether regulation was within the police power, an
inquiry that entailed a purely categorical judgment. They did not ask
whether the benefits of an abridgment outweighed the detriment to the
regulated entity. While such analysis may have involved balancing sub
silentio, there is no confirmation of such balancing in judicial opinions.
151. See Meese, supra note 23, at 169-70 (arguing that the existence of a less restrictive
alternative does not exclude the possibility that the restraint merely combats market failure and thus
produces no competitive harm to begin with). As I have explained elsewhere, application of a less
restrictive alternative test is consistent with a total welfare approach. See Meese, supra note 111, at 710
("This less restrictive alternative test follows naturally from a 'total welfare' standard, in that it
minimizes the misallocation of resources .... ").
152. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("[T]he harms and benefits must be
weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance,
reasonable." (citation omitted)); FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 118,
§ 3.37; Meese, supra note 23, at 108 n.l57 (collecting numerous judicial and academic authorities
calling for such balancing in the Section 1 context). Cf HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 260 (1994) (appearing to argue that, if benefits
and harms really do coexist, the court's only conclusion must be to condemn the agreement).
153. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REv.
1265, 1267-68, 1272-73, 1348-57.
154. !d. at 1347-57 (detailing the results in those cases where courts balanced harms against
benefits).
155. A LexisNexis search ofpre-1970 cases finds no reference to Rule of Reason "balancing."
156. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987) (describing balancing in constitutional law as a relatively recent development).
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In the antitrust context, this categorical approach manifested itself as a
safe harbor for "normal" or "ordinary" restraints. 157 Restraints fell into this
category if defendants would have adopted them without regard to their
exclusionary impact. If restraints fell into this category, courts did not
balance harms against benefits. United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co. is a classic example. 158 In that case, no one doubted that the challenged
agreements helped preserve the defendant's monopoly. 159 The Court,
however, rejected the government's case because the challenged practices
had been adopted in a workably competitive market and were motivated by
ordinary commercial objectives; that is, in modem parlance, they would
have been adopted without regard to their exclusionary impact. 160 The
Court did not purport to balance the benefits of the practices against the
harms, even though the practices obviously fortified the defendant's
monopoly. It was enough for the Court that the challenged practices, as
Standard Oil put it, "tended to fructify and develop trade." 161 While
banning such practices could enhance competition in the short run, nothing
prevented other firms from exercising their own liberty to engage in similar
157. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) (holding that the Shennan
Act does not ban "normal and usual contracts essential to individual freedom"). The American Tobacco
Court also emphasized Standard Oil's holding that the Shennan Act "did not forbid or restrain the
power to make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether
by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose." !d. at 179. See also FfC v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
261 U.S. 463,475-76 (1923) (holding that the antitrust laws do not ban "ordinary business methods").
158. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. ofN.J., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
159. !d. at 56 (noting that the company had "magnitude," which was both "result and cause of
efficiency").
160. !d. at 65 (finding that the defendant adopted the challenged practices for reasons that "move[]
and may move the transactions of men"). For instance, the Court explained that the practice of leasing
machines helped finance the entry of small shoe manufacturers and ensured that machines were used in
proper relation to other machines. !d. at 63-64. See also William H. Page, Legal Realism and the
Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. I, 16-17 (1995) (explaining how the United Shoe decision
rested on a determination that challenged voluntary arrangements benefited both parties). As I have
suggested before, the test applied in United Shoe was akin to the modem "no economic sense" test.
Meese, supra note Ill, at 677 n.70. See also Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct
Under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413-17 (2006) (articulating
the "no economic sense" test).
161. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911). Cf Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 181
(describing condemnation of American Tobacco as resting on determination that the firm obtained its
monopoly "not by the mere exertion of the ordinary right to contract and to trade, but by methods
devised in order to monopolize the trade by driving competitors out of business").
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practices. Protection for such liberty, and not regulatory intervention, was
the best guarantor of useful competition in the long run. 162
V. CONCLUSION
In 193 7, the Supreme Court abandoned meaningful protection for
economic liberty. Lochner has since become one of the most reviled
decisions in constitutional law-a quintessential exemplar of unbridled
judicial activism, at least according to its numerous critics. Nonetheless,
Lochner lives on in Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason, which modem
courts embrace as a definitive exposition of the Sherman Act. That is to
say, Standard Oil read the Sherman Act so as not to abridge liberty of
contract, employing the Rule of Reason to implement Lochner's vision of
the appropriate scope of economic regulation. Contrary to assertions by
some, this result was consistent with prior decisions such as Addyston Pipe
and Joint Traffic.

Recognition of Standard Oifs Lochnerian origins can help facilitate
the faithful application of the Rule of Reason and thus shed light on
modem controversies. For instance, a Lochnerian Rule of Reason would
ban only those arrangements that reduce total economic welfare, leaving
wealth-creating agreements that incidentally injure purchasers in the
relevant market unscathed. Moreover, such a Rule of Reason would not
entail "balancing" a restraint's benefits against any harms it might create,
but instead would validate any practice necessary to create significant
benefits, that is, so-called normal or ordinary conduct. Perhaps recognition
of Standard Oifs Lochnerian origins will help provide solutions to other
antitrust controversies as well.
162. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61--62 ("[T]he freedom of the individual right to contract when
not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of
monopoly ....").

